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 The article provides a theoretical overview and empirical summary of the 
contributions to this Special Issue.  The Issue makes four contributions to the 
literature on comparative capitalism. First, its analysis of institutional change adopts a 
long-term historical perspective that allows us to observe the potentially 
transformative effects of relatively slow and incremental changes. Second, it 
examines the linkages between four levels of institutions that regulate the economy – 
the international, macro (national), meso, and micro.  Third, the national case studies 
compare change and linkages across six core institutional domains.  And fourth, the 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The comparative capitalisms (CC) approach to political economy is concerned with 
the diversity and change of institutions across countries (Jackson and Deeg, 2008).  
Institutional diversity is associated with distinct “logics” of economic action that may 
yield comparative institutional advantages for different types of economic activities.  
At the same time, institutions are themselves a result of socio-political compromises 
built on a complex distribution of power among different economic actors and their 
interactions within existing political institutions.  The early CC literature was largely 
focused on explaining the stability of such institutional arrangements rooted in path 
dependent political legacies (Pierson, 2000) and institutional complementarities 
across economic domains (Hall and Soskice, 2001).  But the analytical focus of the 
CC literature has recently shifted toward the attempts to document and explain 
institutional change in relation to European integration, liberalisation, globalisation 
and most recently financialisation.   
 
This Special Issue presents case studies of selected European countries and the 
United States that document and analyse the trajectories of institutional change over 
the last 30 years—from roughly 1979 to the onset of the current financial crisis 
around 2008/9.  The papers identify critical junctures and key periods in the change of 
each model, and examine the role of public policy in shaping these changes.  The case 
studies follow a common methodology and approach intended to facilitate a 
comparative understanding of the patterns and drivers of institutional change, as well 
as how liberalisation impacts countries in similar and dissimilar ways.     
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We believe this collection makes four contributions to understanding 
institutional change in the CC literature.  First, the analysis of institutional change 
adopts a long-term historical perspective that allows us to observe the potentially 
transformative effects of relatively slow and incremental changes (Streeck and Thelen, 
2005).  Even the radical liberalisation policies of Britain’s Thatcher or America’s 
Reagan years were less coherent and more gradual in their effects than often assumed 
and unfolded often through unintended consequences across different interdependent 
policies fields.  Second, we examine the linkages between four levels of institutions 
that regulate the economy: external aspects of international relations, the macro level 
of national politics, the meso level of state policies and their effects in particular 
institutional domains, and the micro level of how firms and other economic actors 
cope enact, reproduce, or modify existing institutions (Deeg and Jackson, 2007).  
Third, all cases compare the changes and linkages across six institutional domains:  
finance, corporate governance and responsibility, industrial relations, education/skill 
formation, industrial policy, and the welfare state.  Unlike most studies focused on 
specific domains, this scope provides a uniquely comprehensive analysis of all the 
key domains that constitute each national political economy.  Finally, we highlight 
how institutions are shaped by different sets of socio-political compromises.  
Particular attention is given to the role of the state and regulatory policy in the process 




2. Dimensions of Institutional Diversity and Change 
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Comparative studies inevitably depend on a conceptual framework to map and 
benchmark the diversity of institutions and their change over time.  The CC literature 
lacks agreement on the number of distinct types of capitalisms, the key institutional 
domains defining such typologies, and the conceptual dimensions used to compare 
institutions within those domains.  Rather, the CC literature offers a number of 
competing theories about institutional change, the sources of socio-economic 
dynamism, and the role of politics.  This section briefly reviews existing conceptual 
typologies in the CC literature and summarizes our major findings regarding change 
in each institutional domain.   
 
2.1. Limits of Existing Typologies  
 
The ‘varieties of capitalism’ (VoC) approach  (Hall and Soskice, 2001) has been 
the most influential strand of the CC literature.  This theory identifies two basic types 
of production regimes (capitalisms):  liberal market economies (LME's) and 
coordinated market economies (CME's) based on the extent of market coordination 
through investment in transferable assets (LMEs) vs. non-market or strategic 
coordination through investment in specific assets (CMEs).  The degree of 
coordination is lined to the political strength of producer interests with regime 
characteristics: political systems that foster decision through consensus favour the 
policies and institutional stability necessary for asset-specific production strategies 
found in CMEs.  Institutional complementarities in the mode of coordination across 
different domains also lend stability, coherence and economic efficiency to each 
model.  VoC’s explanatory strength and appeal lie in its parsimony, but the reduction 
of institutional diversity to a single dimension has also been its liability.  The 
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framework misses many differences in how coordination takes place within CME 
countries and faces trouble accounting for mixed cases lacking institutional 
complementarities.  By subsuming too much diversity under a broad label, VoC have 
been criticisad for overemphasizing continuity and missing important aspects of 
institutional change.   
 
Alternative CC frameworks stem from literatures on governance (Crouch and 
Streeck, 1997, Hollingsworth and Boyer, 1997), national business systems (Whitley, 
2007) , or social systems of innovation  (Amable, 2003).   These frameworks 
introduce a number of additional dimensions for understanding institutional diversity.  
For example, the governance approach uses a number of generic coordination 
mechanisms to describe how economic activity is organised in a particular domain 
and extends this to understanding national cases in terms of combinations.  This 
framework describes CMEs countries in more rich and complex terms, where 
coordination takes place in inter-firm networks as in Japan, formal business 
associations such as sectoral unions and employers’ associations as in Germany, or 
more community based coordinated as in the Third Italy.  Other frameworks 
emphasize the varied role of the state in institutionalisation (Whitley, 2007) and the 
role of socio-political power relationships and coalitions among unequal actors with 
divergent interests (Amable 2003, 7-11).   Moreover, new ‘types’ of capitalism 
emerging in transition economies such as Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) do not fit 
neatly into existing categories or typologies (Bohle and Greskovits, 2007, Hancké, 
Rhodes and Thatcher, 2007).  CEE countries have been described as “dependent 
market economies” (DME) (Nölke and Vliegenthart, 2009), whereby institutions have 
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developed in ways very reliant on foreign direct investment and multinational 
enterprises exploiting relatively cheap labour.   
 
While there are useful studies utilizing a quantitative approach to identify 
capitalist systems and change, the clustering of institutional variables into cohesive 
country groups is very sensitive to the institutional domains selected for the analysis 
and is unstable across different measures (Ahlquist and Breunig, 2009).  As a guide to 
empirical investigation, therefore, this JEPP special issue takes a historical case study 
approach that draws loosely on Amable’s (2003) distinction in Europe among the 
market-based model, Nordic or social-democratic model, Continental European model, 
and Mediterranean model.  We focus on six institutional domains: finance, corporate 
governance, industrial relations and labor market institutions, the education and 
training system, the welfare state, and industrial policy (e.g. product market 
regulation).    Rather than using a common dimension for each domain, we describe 
each domain in terms of institutional typologies drawn from specific literatures on 
each domain (Jackson and Deeg, 2006), which are summarized in Figure 1.  To 
facilitate comparison, each country case study in the Issue includes a table showing a 
basic political chronology of significant institutional reforms in each of these domains 
(Jackson and Wylegala, 2012).  
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
2.2. Change in What Direction?   
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Quantitative analyses show that, while there is significant change within 
numerous institutional domains, there is a remarkable stability of institutional clusters 
across OECD countries through 2008 (Becue, Bouaroudj, Carrincazeaux and Lung, 
2011).  In Europe, these clusters conform closely to the market-based, Nordic, 
Continental and Mediterranean type of capitalism (Amable 2003).  In other words, the 
relative differences between the countries included in this volume have largely 
remained stable across our selected domains.  For example, Germany is often seen as 
a paradigm case of a “coordinated market economy,” and strategic coordination 
remains a remarkably stable feature despite the huge external shock of German 
unification and other institutional changes in the German model.  In short, no overall 
convergence has taken place toward a single variety of capitalism.   
 
Nonetheless, the contributions to this special issue show how this picture of 
relative stability hides a larger and more important set of observations about change.  
In 1979, even liberal market economies such as the UK or USA were far less 
uniformly liberal and grounded in post-war social compromises of managerial 
capitalism, pluralistic industrial relations, and state regulation of markets.  Both 
countries underwent a deepening of liberalisation that created new institutional logics 
based on “financialised” interdependencies between capital markets, corporations, and 
the household sector (Krippner, 2011).  In contrast to the common imagery of the 
“Thatcher revolution,” Gospel and Edwards stress the incremental nature of many 
changes in the UK, which involved policy drift and unexpected interactions across 
policy fields.  Deeg also shows that the highly financialised US economy was not a 
linear process nor an inevitable result of neo-liberal policies, as often presumed, but 
an emergent feature of how corporations and households redefined their interests over 
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time.  Similarly, coordinated market economies have undergone significant change:  
Schnyder documents how the exhaustion of the Swedish model after the 1970s 
underwent crisis and emergence of new forms of coordination based on a very 
different institutional logic.  The continuity of Swedish institutions is thus closely 
bound up with how these institutions changed and developed new competitive 
strengths.  Jackson and Sorge find Germany maintained many features of its 
coordinated model, but this model became far less encompassing over time and 
leading to greater internal diversity in governing institutions.  Amable et al show how 
France underwent substantial liberalisation, but successive policies reshaped political 
coalitions in ways that made changes incremental or partial in their effects.  Rangone 
and Solari demonstrate how Italy adapted its model of family and state-enhanced 
capitalism to a new and very different liberalised market environment in Europe, yet 
the result is an incoherent and politically intractable set of institutions.     
 
Thus, our case studies point to very substantial institutional transformation.  
Looking across the cases two common patterns we find are a growing liberalisation in 
relation to the role of the state, and a growing segmentation (dualisation) in terms of 
employment conditions and social protection.  These trends create very different sets 
of challenges and responses within each country in relation to the diverse institutional 
starting points.  In this section, we thus highlight the common aspects to better situate 
the diversity of the cases in a common narrative framework. 
  
A first trend over the past three decades is liberalisation (Yamamura and Streeck, 
2003).  While liberalisation is often equated with the withdrawal of state intervention, 
it is not just about the degree of state involvement but the kind of state intervention.  
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Liberalisation may be defined “as the politically implemented and politically 
legitimated delegation of allocation and distribution decisions to markets” (Höpner, 
Petring and Seikel, 2009).  Regulatory liberalisation refers to deregulation and 
privatisation of public utilities, policies to increase competition among market actors, 
the strengthening of property rights, as well as the deregulation of labour markets (e.g. 
employment protection) and financial markets.  Distributive liberalisation includes 
reduction of transfer payments related to pensions, unemployment, subvention, and 
public spending.  Thus far from being a unified phenomenon, our cases show that 
liberalisation occurs in different ways across institutional domains.  Drawing on the 
contributions to this Special Issue, Figure 2 presents an overview of empirical 
findings across six domains.   
 
Financial systems show substantial liberalisation and growth of market-oriented 
activity with a corresponding weakening of long-term relational forms of bank-
industry relationships.  The UK and US have historically rather different approaches 
to financial market regulation, but both have moved toward a more liberal system and 
seen major developments toward highly “financialised” patterns of growth.  Other 
countries moved to a more complex mix of banks and markets.  Sweden liberalised 
rapidly during the mid-1980s and, despite a banking crisis in 1991, remained on this 
path.  France moved away from state-centred banking and other types of patient 
capital toward the most market-based system on the Continent.  Germany maintains 
strong relational banking among cooperative and savings banks focused on 
Mittelstand firms, but has also seen a growth in stock market activity and changing 
strategic orientation of large private banks.  Consequently, one can observe a 
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bifurcation of financial arrangements in these countries between the older, bank-based 
and market-based mechanisms (Deeg, 2009).   
 
Corporate governance reform often came slightly later and partially as a 
response to financial market liberalisation.  The UK was an early mover, where 
shareholder-oriented corporate governance institutions were developed both through 
law and self-regulatory codes regarding the structure and duties of boards.  Other 
countries followed with measures to strengthen shareholder rights and deregulate the 
use of corporate equity.  Nonetheless, these policies had a less uniform effect on 
patterns of ownership and control of large firms.  Insider-dominated corporate 
ownership has persisted in Sweden and Italy alongside a slowly growing influence of 
foreign institutional investors, whereas a greater dissolution of patient capital took 
place in France and Germany.  Despite the dominance of liberal policies, a unified 
European market for corporate control has not emerged.  Similarly, the role of 
stakeholders in European corporate governance remains diverse.  Employee 
participation has remained a stable feature in Sweden and Germany, but these policies 
have not been emulated elsewhere.   
 
Regarding industrial relations and labour markets, liberalisation has occurred 
through the institutional layering and subsequent growth of newer, flexible forms of 
employment.  Despite watershed industrial conflicts of the UK coal miners or US air 
traffic controllers, the weakening role of unions in liberal countries involved a long-
term and slow decline.  Even in labour-friendly Sweden the highly centralised system 
of collective bargaining shifted to a more loosely coordinated pattern by 1990.  Thus, 
many countries saw a gradual decline in the coverage of collective bargaining and 
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shifts toward more decentralised, firm-level forms of bargaining.  Meanwhile, 
employment arrangements outside the core were made much more flexible.  For 
example, the French introduced substantial deregulation of contingent employment in 
2005—making it possible for French firms to adopt more dualistic human resource 
management strategies.  To some extent, liberalisation was counterbalanced by new 
types of state intervention that sought to strengthen the position of core workers in 
more coordinated countries or compensate for the growing vulnerability of peripheral 
workers in liberal economies.  For example, the UK Labour government of 1997 
introduced a National Minimum Wage.  In Germany, left governments introduced 
reforms to facilitate the adaptation of works councils to changing forms of network-
based organisation.  But as discussed below, these measures fit a larger trend toward 
greater segmentation of rights and protections across the workforce.   
 
Liberalisation was perhaps least uniform in the area of education and training.  
Institutions of collective skill formation represent a stunning variety of coordination 
modes, which reflect very complex political dynamics (Busemeyer and Trampusch, 
2012).  Europeanisation has spurred efforts to enhance the comparability and 
portability of qualifications across Europe, but not via a strict harmonisation of rules.  
In some ways, states have been increasing their role in provision of remedial and 
higher education.  Also, in the UK, government made efforts to institutionalisation 
more coordinated forms of training and skill formation, although the effects were 
rather marginal to the overall context of liberal policies toward employees.   
 
Welfare state reform presents a complex picture and the Special Issue highlights 
two aspects: social insurance and pensions.  Reforms to unemployment insurance and 
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social benefits have led to substantial retrenchment in some countries, and often gone 
hand-in-hand with liberalisation of labour markets for atypical employment under the 
rubric of ‘flexicurity’.  The combined effect of labour market and welfare state 
policies has been to vastly expand atypical and low wage employment in the service 
sector, which is also associated with rising levels of inequality (OECD, 2008).  
Meanwhile, reforms to public pensions have been rather less extensive.  Private 
pension funds have become a common institutional feature, but their role remains 
relatively marginal in many countries.  Across these domains, social protections have 
not disappeared but become more varied and less uniform.  As will be discussed later, 
these changes also have longer-term destabilizing effects on core social protections.   
 
Industrial policy reforms reflect a broad trend toward more liberalisation of 
markets in public-relevant sectors of the economy, as well as far reaching efforts of 
privatisation.  While all countries engaged in privatisation and market liberalisation, 
they did so to different degrees and utilizing different approaches.  Liberal countries 
underwent significant change in this domain as well, but the most regulated 
economies tended to change more while maintaining some important differences to 
the US or UK.  Countries also differed greatly with regard to whether industrial 
policies focused on attracting foreign direct investment and maintaining suitable 
supports for multi-national firms—here Ireland and the CEE countries showed certain 
similarities.  Differences in industrial policy were also shaped by partisan politics.  
Right wing governments tend to privatise more, whereas left-wing governments 
engage in more liberalisation (Belloc and Nicita, 2011). 
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A second common trend across our cases concerns how public policies influence 
the institutionalised forms of governance among private economic actors (see Thelen, 
2009).  The case studies support the conclusion that European economies have 
become both less coordinated and less solidaristic over time.  However, countries had 
different starting points and changed to different extents across these dimensions. The 
dimension of coordination is based on the presence of relationship-specific assets 
rather than liberal forms based on transferable assets.  Coordination is often measured 
in terms of long-term patient capital, the level and coordination of collective 
bargaining, non-market cooperative arrangements between firms, or the duration of 
employment relationships (Hall and Gingerich, 2009).  In financial systems and 
corporate governance, for example, liberalisation created new financing alternatives 
that eroded long-term coordination between firms and patient investors.  Regulatory 
liberalisation had a larger impact in countries, like France and Germany, where the 
state played a greater role in supporting private coordination through bank-firm and 
inter-corporate ties.  By contrast, informal modes of coordination through families, as 
in Italy and Sweden, have proven to be surprisingly durable.  Meanwhile, 
coordination generally remains very important in employment relations.  Sweden and 
Germany have preserved coordination in employment relations via collective 
bargaining and co-determination in core sectors. Similarly, in Italy employment 
protection remains high, despite loosening of restrictions of non-regular employment 
and reinforcement of pre-existing dualism.  In sum, the uneven unwinding of 
coordination across domains has resulted in a declining coherence of institutional 
arrangements.  An open question is whether new institutional linkages will generate 





While changes in coordination are significant, even greater shifts have taken place 
along the dimension of solidarism versus segmentalism (Höpner, 2007, Swenson, 
2002, Thelen, 2009).  Solidarism implies universalistic mechanisms for redistribution 
to weaker market participants, whereas segmentation implies the exclusion of workers 
from rewards or benefits across industry lines or other groupings.  Solidarity can be 
measured in terms of the coverage of collective bargaining, degree of labour market 
dualism, public spending in support of household income, and universalistic forms of 
employment protection.  As discussed above, industrial relations underwent 
incremental change that reinforced existing divisions between labour market insiders 
and outsiders.  In short, core firms retain coordinated relations with their workforces, 
but the coverage of such institutions has become narrower in scope and thus less 
solidaristic (Palier and Thelen, 2010).  As market pressures have increased through 
liberalisation, stakeholders often protected existing forms of coordination by reducing 
their scope and redistributing gains from cooperation across a smaller group of 
insiders.  Thus, coordination faced a subtle form of erosion and reduction to a core 
group of industries and firms.  The resulting shift toward more institutionalised 
segmentalism has long-term consequences for the socio-political dynamics of 
different forms of capitalism and the future dynamics of institutional change.  These 
changes have been reinforced by the shift in welfare state arrangements to a dominant 
‘flexicurity’ approach. 
 
 An interesting question remains as to development and change in Central and 
Eastern European countries.  Despite obvious differences in the institutional legacies 
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between Western European and CEE economies, we can still analyze the evolution of 
CEE economies utilizing the institutional dimensions developed in the CC literature.  
The paper by Duman and Kurekova focuses on Hungary and Slovakia, which 
emerged from their socialist past as relatively advanced and internationally integrated 
economies.  In terms of finance, bank-based finance still dominates but the most 
distinguishing feature is their high dependence on foreign investment in fixed capital 
formation, a process encouraged by government policies. A spill-on effect for 
corporate governance is the large role of multinationals via control over subsidiaries, 
and the emergence of hvbrid forms of state and foreign ownership among privatised 
state enterprises.  Despite liberalisation reforms, corporate governance remains a de 
facto insider-oriented affair, and both countries adopted at least a modicum of 
employee representation at the board-level.  Altogether the overall trajectory of 
finance and corporate governance in these countries shares affinities with more 
coordinated models of capitalism. 
 
Meanwhile, industrial relations institutions in these cases remain complex and 
politically contested.  Hungarian unions remain more fragmented and politicised 
along the lines of the Italian model.  Meanwhile, Slovakia adopted a more corporatist 
structure with state support (after 2001) to promote more coordinated and solidaristic 
collective bargaining.  Both countries also legislated workplace representation by 
independent works councils.  Turning to the situation in education and training, the 
relative involvement of social partners is the opposite—namely, extensive 
involvement in Hungary contrasts with a more state-centred approach in Slovakia.  In 
sum, Hungary and Slovakia represent the novel mixtures of institutions that prevail in 




3. Socio-Political Dynamics of Institutional Change  
 
What social and political factors can help explain both the growing liberalisation and 
dualism across countries, but also the non-convergence of many institutions?   Our 
contributors seek answers to these questions using a historical institutional approach 
that stresses how actors define their interests in relation to institutions, but also change 
institutions over time through their actions—these processes are ongoing and 
recursive (Thelen, 1999).  Our view of institutions does not assume path dependence 
but allows that incremental forms of change may also be transformative (Streeck and 
Thelen, 2005).  Institutions may create their own endogenous momentum for change 
over time, because even institutional persistence requires adaptation (Streeck, 2009).   
Institutions also reflect broad socio-political compromises about the rules governing 
the economy.  Studying their dynamics implies a complex analysis across different 
levels of the phenomenon and in this Special Issue we consider four levels —external 
influence of international relations and foreign dependence, the macro level of 
national electoral politics and coalition building, the meso level of policies toward 
particular institutional domains and how these interact with one another, and the 
micro level of how firms and other economic actors enact, reproduce, or modify 
existing institutions (Deeg and Jackson, 2007).   
 
At the international level, national socio-economic models are increasingly open to 
international influence triggered by the entry of foreign actors (e.g. institutional 
investors), the exit or relocation of activities (e.g. MNCs) or transnational political 
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processes enforced by non-state forms of authority (Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson, 
2006), and inter-state cooperation.  Unlike the US or Asia, institutional change in 
Europe is now deeply intertwined through the dynamic of EU integration where the 
politics of common rules and standards reduced the diversity of institutions through a 
wide-ranging liberalisation push.  However, the effects of this push across 
institutional domains and countries are asymmetric.  The EU has larger influence in 
the area of financial markets relative to industrial relations or vocational training.  
Across countries, the liberalisation policies of the EU have had a larger influence on 
the more coordinated models of capitalism, pushing them toward more rules-based 
and market-conforming forms of governance.  This phenomenon of ‘negative 
integration’ has been widely document among EU scholars (Scharpf, 2000).  
Meanwhile, countries with more coordinated forms of capitalism have been far less 
successful in exporting social protection at the EU-level.  The result has been a 
declining coherence of policies as policy making is fragmented across a multi-level 
political regime (Callaghan, 2010). 
 
At the macro-level, the role of politics in institutional change defies simple 
explanation using established CC concepts.  In terms of electoral politics, the cases 
presented in this issue suggest it is very difficult to map the trajectories of reform onto 
simple left-right political ideologies and coalitions.  In particular, the power of left 
political coalitions seems to have surprisingly little explanatory power in relation to 
differences in the degree or form of liberalisation across countries.  British ‘New 
Labour,’ the US Clinton administration, French socialists, and the German Social 
Democrats promoted reform of social protection and labour rights to changing 
circumstances, yet also furthered the agenda of financial market liberalisation and 
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policies that solidified dualism in the labour market.  This “party paradox” is apparent 
in a number of distinct policy areas (Cioffi and Höpner, 2006).  Meanwhile, the 
different traditions of centre-right political parties based on more Christian versus 
liberal approaches may help explain the more incremental nature of liberalisation in 
countries such as Germany.   The overall coherence and complementarities in a given 
institutional set-up is closely related to the particular socio-political compromise.   
 
Another key variable in the CC literature has been the character of the political system, 
namely whether it is consensual or majoritarian.  Consensual systems are thought to 
allow greater integration of producer groups in the policy process, shape more lasting 
types of social compromises between left and right parties, and facilitate more lasting 
forms of redistributive policies.  However, the UK case shows that even in 
majoritarian regimes, radical shifts in policies often take the character of ‘muddling 
through’ where liberalisation is worked out at meso and micro-levels in ways that 
often involve counter-movements and shifting state action toward market regulation 
and a residual focus on compensating for market failures.  Similarly, the 
fragmentation of state power played a major role in the competitive deregulation of 
finance in the USA. 
 
At the meso-level, changes across institutional domains are often interconnected.  
While the stability of socio-economic models is often explained by institutional 
complementarities, interdependence may also imply that changes in one institution 
exert pressure to change other, related institutions.  One important dynamic across 
countries has been renegotiating the relationship between more market-oriented forms 
of finance and corporate governance, on one hand, and social protection in the labour 
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market and through the welfare state, on the other. The US case, for example, shows 
how financial market liberalisation slowly evolved into financialisation as households 
became increasingly dependent on private pension funds, these funds in turn 
promoted shareholder value forms of corporate governance, and even unions 
redefined their interests in relation to shareholder activism.  In other countries, the 
link between finance and labour played out differently:  Sweden has managed to 
largely maintain the egalitarian and solidaristic nature of its economic system, while 
solidarism has declined in important ways in Germany. Different types of corporate 
ownership and control may account for these divergent outcomes. In particular, the 
Swedish ownership structure has proven to guarantee a higher capacity for 
coordination and solidarism than the now demised bank-centered ownership networks 
in Germany.  As discussed above, coordinated economies also reshaped the links 
between welfare states and employment regulations toward a ‘flexicurity’ approach 
that helped accommodate financial market pressures on firms, but reinforced 
segmentation of the labour market. 
 
Finally, at the micro-level, institutional change is shaped by how different types of 
organisations utilise, avoid, or otherwise strategically respond to dominant institutions.  
These micro processes are important to institutional change where institutions are 
reinterpreted, contested, or conflicts emerge over institutionalised rules. Institutions 
may thus undergo slow and often unintended processes of incremental change, rather 
than through large-scale collapse and replacement of institutions (Streeck and Thelen, 
2005).  One important way in which liberalisation shapes institutional change is by 
deinstitutionalizing some organisational forms and encouraging market-driven 
experimentation and competition with others (Crouch, 2005).  Liberalisation thus 
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frequently amplifies differences between large and small firms, due to the different 
degrees of internationalisation of operations, ownership and finance.  More generally, 
as contributions to this Issue demonstrate, liberalisation is related to rising 
heterogeneity or internal diversity of organisations within national economies (Lane 
and Wood, 2009).  In the UK, for example, liberalised industrial relations led to more 
heterogeneous forms of human resource management (HRM) practices and 
divergence between firms pursuing high performance HRM relative to low road 
strategies.  This growing diversity has played out in a parallel fashion in more 
coordinated market economies.  In Germany market-oriented financing for large firms 
and bank-oriented finance for SMEs has created bifurcated patterns within the same 
national model (Deeg, 2009). Similarly, multinational and domestic firms play very 
different roles and participate in domestic institutions in different ways within CEE 
countries.   
 
 
4. The Future of Capitalism is Capitalism, or is it?  
 
Over the last 30 years, European forms of capitalism have moved toward a more 
liberal but in some ways more variegated set of institutions.  Looking across a variety 
of countries and policy areas over a long period of time, this Special Issue shows both 
the common trend toward a more liberal form of capitalism but also variations on this 
overarching theme.  Markets themselves create their own dynamics, which have 
varied effects on firms and other economic actors in historically diverse institutional 
contexts.  A crucial factor in understanding change is examining how actors seek to 
build complementarities across different institutional domains, either by following 
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coherent strategies across them or seeking to compensate for the deficiencies of one 
sphere through complementary but different strategies in others.   
 
In this regard, the financial crisis and resulting economic crises after 2008 represent 
something of a watershed moment where the existing logics and complementarities in 
different models of capitalism have reached a moment of exhaustion.  Further 
liberalisation of markets is unlikely to restore economic stability.  In fact, the 
continued competitive strength of countries such as Germany or Sweden is strongly 
linked to the continuity of institutional coordination.  Meanwhile, the crisis has 
exposed the growing tensions within the Italian model and unsustainable nature of 
financialisation in the US and UK.   
 
The role of the state and public policy has been an important driver of liberalisation.  
But at the same time, liberalisation itself calls forth political demand to re-embed 
markets within stable institutional arrangements that provide sufficient levels of 
collective goods for firms and sustain politically acceptable distributions of economic 
rewards in society.  Unfortunately, our analysis also shows how the political 
foundations of solidarism within advanced capitalist economies remain weak.  The 
growing economic segmentation that has resulted from liberalisation has fragmented 
class-based interests between labour market and welfare state insiders and outsiders, 
as well as institutionalised the interests of finance within government itself (e.g. 
lobbying, public debt), firms (e.g. financialisation of business activities), and 
households (e.g. consumer credit, mortgages, pension funds).  This situation is further 
complicated by the multi-level nature of policy making in the EU.  While liberal 
capitalism will prove resilient to the current crisis (Crouch, 2011), continued 
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marketisation stands in ever greater tension with the basic legitimacy of democratic 
public policy that must deal with its very real economic, social, political and 





Figure 1:  Domains for Political Reform Chronology  
 
Institutional Domain Typology Examples of key areas for 
political reform 
Financial systems Bank / market-based / 
FDI dependent 
Stock marketing listing rules; 
separation of commercial vs. 
investment bank activities 
Corporate governance Insider / outsider or 
stakeholder / 
shareholder 
Board independence; executive 
compensation; share buy-backs; 
privatisation 
Industrial relations Conflictarian / 
pluralism / corporatist 
 
Board-level codetermination; 
works councils; recognition of 
unions 
Education and skill creation State / association / 
market / firm-based 
skill formation 
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Figure 2   Trajectories of Change across Six Institutional Domains, 1979-2009 
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